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An Oracle Without Foresight? Plaintiffs'
Arduous Burdens under U.S. v. Oracle
AMANDA J. PARKISON HASSID*
INTRODUCTION
The decision in United States v. Oracle Corporation' has the
potential to obliterate the government's ability to successfully block
certain mergers. Because merger cases like Oracle rarely make it to trial,
the extensive Oracle decision is likely to have great impact on future
decisions. But ironically, at the same time that other courts may look to
Oracle for guidance, the Oracle court itself largely disregards persuasive
evidence The unique set of circumstances in Oracle created little
binding precedent on Judge Vaughn Walker, who did not shy away from
using this freedom. The court set forth requirements for the government
that differed drastically from those proposed in Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Guidelines) promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) -requirements that
effectively increased the burden of proof for the government. In
addition, the Oracle court disregarded volumes of the government's
evidence, requesting instead evidence that would be nearly impossible
for any litigant to offer.
The length and apparent thoroughness of the seventy-eight page
decision in Oracle provides economists, lawyers, and students with
enough material for volumes of commentary. The scope of this decision
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; B.A. Amherst
College, 2003. I worked for a year as a paralegal on the Oracle matter at the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice. While my work on that case piqued my interest in antitrust in general and
Oracle in particular, I took pains to ensure that every fact and opinion in this Note is based only upon
publicly available information. I would like to thank Pam Cole for her guidance as an attorney at the
Antitrust Division during the Oracle matter, as my professor of antitrust at Hastings, and as my
mentor for this Note. I would also like to thank Professors Jonathan Baker of American University
and Andrew Gavil of Howard University School of Law for helping to clarify some antitrust concepts
by e-mail. Last, thanks as always to Jonathan Hassid.
I. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 0s98 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
2. For instance, the Oracle court varies from the Guidelines. See infra Parts 11-III for further
discussion. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ o.I (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclguidelines/horizbook/
hmgI.html [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
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means that addressing all topics covered by the decision would be
difficult in a single note. Instead, this Note evaluates the impact two
aspects of the decision might have on the government's ability to prove
future antitrust cases. First, the Oracle court's requirements for proving a
unilateral effects case involving differentiated products dramatically
increase the onus on similarly situated antitrust plaintiffs. Second, the
court's disparaging treatment of the government's evidence further
increases the difficulty of the government's task.
In sum, the reasoning behind the Oracle decision sets the bar so high
for the government that applying it to other cases would risk blessing
mergers that will result in a substantial lessening of competition in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. For this reason, I argue that
despite the court's extensive analysis and discussion of economics, other
courts should think carefully before giving the Oracle decision persuasive
force.
The beginning of this Note will provide the context needed to
understand the impact of the Oracle decision. Part I will describe what it
takes to prove a case under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Part II details
the specific facts of the Oracle case, and it contrasts the Guidelines'
standards of proof with those used in Oracle. In addition, Part II explains
how the Oracle court's divergence from the Guidelines' standards have
the practical effect of increasing the plaintiffs' burden of proof. Part III
describes how the court's minimization of the government's evidence
greatly increased the difficulty of the government's task. In particular,
this Part will look at the treatment of the testimony of customer
witnesses, at the testimony of expert witness Marco lansiti, and at
internal business documents.
I. PROVING A CASE UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids acquisitions where "the effect of
such [an] acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."3 The legislative history of the Act suggests
that Congress intended to stop mergers before firms have the power to
profit from anticompetitive behavior. A Senate Report describing the
195o amendments to the Clayton Act states that "'[t]he intent [of the
Act] ... is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman
Act proceeding."' 4 The Supreme Court interprets section 7 in accordance
with the legislative history, stating, for example, that "section 7 of the
Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of market
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
4. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962) (quoting S. REP. No. 81-1775,
at 4-5 (1950)).
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power in their incipiency. The core question is whether a merger may
substantially lessen competition."5
The Guidelines, promulgated by antitrust enforcement agencies,
provide an analytical framework for determining when a merger would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.6 The DOJ and the FTC are bound
by the Guidelines; in order to bring a case to block a merger, the
government must first meet the criteria set forth therein.7 While the
Guidelines do not bind courts, courts nonetheless frequently rely on
them.8 The Guidelines are influential in part because they form a
systematic approach to the analysis of mergers, and in part because the
Supreme Court has not decided a merger case on its merits since the
mid-1970s.9 I take no position on whether the Guidelines are the best
method of evaluating anticompetitive effect. Instead, the Guidelines
have been a persuasive force since their enactment, and any radical
departure from them constitutes a major policy shift. Thus, courts should
recognize that following the Oracle decision will result in furthering this
policy change with the ultimate result of increasing the government's
burden in such cases.
The Guidelines lay out a five-step process to determine when a
merger is likely to be anticompetitive.'" Of particular importance here
are the two steps that define the appropriate product market and that
discern anticompetitive effects. In order to define the product market,
the government begins by hypothesizing a narrow product market." It
then asks what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist in that
product market were to impose a small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price (SSNIP).'2 Often, the price increase posited is 5-10%
above current prices.'3 Next, the government asks whether a hypothetical
price increase would drive so many customers to an alternative product
as to render the price increase unprofitable.'4 If the SSNIP would be
unprofitable, the product market is too narrow. The government then
hypothesizes a new product market, including within it the original
products' next-best substitute.' 5 It repeats the process until a SSNIP
5. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
6. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §§ 0, 0.1.
7. ANDREW L. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 455 (2002).
8. Id.
9. Id.
io. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 0.2.
II. Id. § 1.21.
12. Id. § I.I.
13. James Calder et al., Supplement To The 2003 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review
Proceedings (pts. 1-3), 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 379, 435-36, 445 n.2oI.




would be possible. 6 Only when a hypothetical monopolist would have
the market power to make a SSNIP is the market definition correct. 7
Another step of the Guidelines divides anticompetitive effects into
two categories: unilateral and coordinated. 8 Unilateral effects arise
because merging firms find it profitable to unilaterally raise prices or
suppress output following the merger.'9 That is, the combined firm will
have the ability to raise prices or suppress output on its own, without
needing to coordinate with its competitors. In United States v. Oracle, the
government only provided evidence of unilateral effects, omitting
evidence of coordinated effects," which need not be addressed here. The
Guidelines provide special instructions for certain types of unilateral
effects cases, which will be described below.'
While the Guidelines are an important tool, their purpose is to
ensure that the government only blocks mergers that are likely to
substantially lessen competition.2 The Guidelines do not require the
government to present its case at trial using the Guidelines framework. 3
For instance, the government could present its case during litigation
without describing geographic and product markets, relying instead
entirely on direct evidence that one or both of the merging firms
currently exhibit monopolistic tendencies. So long as the government
proves that the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, it has
met its burden.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF IN UNITED STATES V. ORACLE
A. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES INVOLVED IN UNITED STATES V. ORACLE
The government attempted to block the merger between Oracle and
PeopleSoft for fear that it would substantially lessen competition in part
of the market for enterprise resource planning (ERP) software." ERP
suites manage a company's data across all or most of a company's
activities. 5 Vendors such as Oracle and PeopleSoft divide up the ERP
software into "pillars" that focus on different parts of the enterprise's
needs. 6 For example, a customer can purchase human resources
management (HRM), financial management systems (FMS), supply
x6. Id.
I7. Id.
18. Id. §§ 2.2, .1.
19. Id. § 2.2.
20. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d IO98, 1165-66 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. MERGER GUIDELINESSUpra note 2, § 0.1.
23. Id.
24. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at iioi.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1102.
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chain management (SCM), and customer relations management (CRM)
software from Oracle or PeopleSoft, or it could purchase only one or two
of those pillars.27 A package of many pillars is called an ERP suite." The
government challenged the merger for fear that it would substantially
lessen competition in the markets for FMS and HRM software. In the
government's judgment, the merger did not present a substantial risk of
weakened competition for the other pillars.
The government did not contend that all customers of FMS or HRM
software would be harmed by the merger, however. Instead, it carved out
a portion of the market, which it called "high function" software, whose
customers it believed would be unreasonably harmed by the merger.29 It
divided the market because not all companies need the same level of
sophistication in their ERP suites." For instance, a company with five
hundred employees in a single state will not need a payroll system as
sophisticated as that used by as a large, multinational corporation that
must cut checks in accordance with multiple state and federal tax laws.
Predictably, software targeted to clients with less sophisticated needs is
simpler to build. As a result, more software vendors have successfully
entered the market for these lower function software suites, so that a
merger between Oracle and PeopleSoft would not likely harm
competition for those customers. SAP,3' PeopleSoft,32 and Oracle33 call
customers with less complex needs "mid-market" customers. The
government called customers with more complex needs "large complex
enterprises,"'' (LCEs) and it calls the sophisticated software in question
"high function software."35 The government challenged the merger for
fear that it would reduce competition in the high function software
market. It did not contend that mid-market customers would be harmed.
According to the government, before the merger, only three vendors
sold high function software that would be acceptable to LCEs: Oracle,
PeopleSoft, and SAP.36 The merger, therefore, would lower the number
of competitors from three to two. 37 It asserted that among those three,
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1 io3.
29. Id. at iio2.
30. See id. at 1125-26 (noting that Daimler Chrysler's HRM requirements were too complex for
vendors other than Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP).
31. Id. at 1152.
32. Id. at 1137.
33. Plaintiffs Proposed Findings Of Fact: Public Version at 1 3.5.1.1, United States v. Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 5o98 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0807 VRW) [hereinafter PFOF] ("Frank
Prestipino, Oracle's Vice President for marketing Oracle's 'midmarket' products views 'mid-market'
and small businesses as a growth opportunity.").
34. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
35. Id. at 1123-24.




Oracle and PeopleSoft were particularly close competitors for LCEs.38
The Oracle court disagreed, however, ruling against most of the
government's proposed findings. It found that the product market was
not limited to Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP, but instead included mid-
market vendors, outsourcers, and best of breed solutions.39 The court also
found that the government had failed to prove that a significant number
of customers regard Oracle and PeopleSoft as their first and second
choices.4'
B. THE GUIDELINES ON DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS AND UNILATERAL
HARM
According to the Guidelines, products are differentiated if "products
sold by different participants in the market are not perfect substitutes for
one another."'" Products rolled out by Oracle, PeopleSoft, SAP, and
other vendors are by no means identical."' They each possess different
qualities and emphasize different priorities. As a result, no product is a
perfect substitute for any other.43 Also, installing a suite or pillar requires
extensive customization because each customer has different functional
needs with which the ERP product must be integrated. Therefore, no
two installations will be identical. While two customers may choose to
purchase and install Oracle's FMS solution, for instance, those two
installations might look quite different.'4 Because no ERP suite is a
perfect substitute for another, the products are "differentiated," as the
court determined them to be.45
The Guidelines state that a merger involving differentiated products
is likely to lead to anticompetitive effects when a significant number of
customers perceive the merged firms' products as their first and second
choices."6 When a significant number of customers view the merged
firms' products as next-best substitutes, the combined firm is likely to be
able to raise prices above competitive levels. If a firm were to raise by 5-
io% the price of a product which was the customer's first choice, the
customer might normally purchase its second choice instead. If the
merged company were to raise the prices of both products or to eliminate
one product entirely, the customer would be more likely to absorb the
price increase instead of turning to its third choice. The more strongly
that customers prefer the two merged products as next-best substitutes,
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1158.
40. Id. at 1172.
41. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.21.
42. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at IO7.
43. Id.
44 Id.
45. Id.; accord MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.21.
46. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.2.
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the higher the price increase is likely to be.
However, the Guidelines do not prohibit every merger just because
some customers might pay higher prices. The Guidelines would permit
the merger if the benefits of merger-specific efficiencies outweigh the
costs. 4 7 Some efficiencies mentioned in the Guidelines are "lower prices,
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products. ' '48 If few customers
are affected, the merger is more likely to go through. Also, the
Guidelines provide that the merger is unlikely to lead to unilateral price
increases if remaining competitors could reposition to replace any
localized competition lost through the merger.49
The Guidelines identify three conditions before presuming that
customers who regard the merging firms' products as first and second
choices make up a significant share of the market."° First, market
concentration levels must reach a specified threshold. Second, each
product's market share must reflect not only its relative appeal as a first
choice, but also its appeal as a second choice.5 Last, the merging firms
must have a combined market share of at least 35%.52 One logical reason
for the last requirement is to ensure that the merger-specific efficiencies
will not outweigh the competitive harm. If the merger will produce a
combined market share of at least 35%, and the other Guidelines
requirements are met, a sufficient number of customers are likely to be
harmed to outweigh efficiencies in typical cases.53
C. THE ORACLE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS
REQUIREMENTS
Since the Oracle decision came out, many antitrust experts have
suggested that the court's decision increases a plaintiff's burden of
proving a differentiated products unilateral effects case, or even that the
government could never succeed under its requirements. 4 The purpose
47. Id. § 4.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 2.212.




54. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion, Unilateral Effects Analysis After Oracle, ANTITRUST, Spring
2005, at 8, iI (Jonathan Baker, moderator) (2005) [hereinafter Roundtable]. Professor Jonathan
Baker moderated a discussion between four other lawyers and economists. See id. at 8. Carl Shapiro
stated that the likely result will be "a huge hurdle for the government when it seeks to block mergers
involving differentiated products based on a theory of unilateral effects." Id. at io. George Cary
agreed that Judge Walker has set up unilateral effects as something you can never prove, in which
narrow markets have to be defined in theory but cannot be defined in practice. Id. at is. Paul Yde
defended parts of the Oracle opinion while recognizing that it seems to impose a higher standard of
proof in a differentiated product setting. Id. at 9. For other commentary on the increased burden on
the plaintiff, see ANDREW GAVIL ET AL., TEACHER'S UPDATE, SUMMER 2006 TO ACCOMPANY ANTITRUST
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of this Note is not to rehash arguments that others have already
articulated. However, a foundational understanding of the contrast
between the court's requirements of proof in Oracle, as compared to the
Guidelines requirements, is necessary before examining the types of
proof that the court permitted.
The court eschewed the Guidelines and set forth its own
requirements for the government to prove a differentiated products,
unilateral effects claim. It listed four factors that the government must
meet in order to satisfy its burden.5 While the court's first, second, and
fourth factors reflect norms perpetuated by the Guidelines, its third
factor might have the practical effect of making the government's success
on any unilateral effects case prohibitively difficult. The court's first
factor is that the products must be differentiated, and it defines
"differentiated" in terms consistent with the Guidelines as described
above.6 Second, the products produced by the merging firms must be
close substitutes for a significant number of customers.57 Another factor,
which the court lists fourth, is that repositioning by a third firm must be
unlikely.f The court lists the most troublesome factor third. It states,
"Other products must be sufficiently different from the products
controlled by the merging firms that a merger would make a small but
significant and non-transitory price increase profitable for the merging
firms. 1
59
In this factor, the court effectively conflates two distinct steps in the
Guidelines: the market definition analysis and the anticompetitive effects
analysis." The Guidelines use the SSNIP test to define a product
market.6' A hypothetical monopolist's ability to make a SSNIP suggests
that the product market is properly drawn, but it has no bearing on
whether the merger will lead to anticompetitive effects. The Guidelines
ask in a separate step whether the merger is likely to lead to
LAw IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEIrS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPEITION POLICY 6o (2oo6) (asking
whether Judge Walker has "set up unilateral effects as a competitive effects possibility that plaintiffs
can never prove"); John Hakrider, Proving Anticompetitive Impact: Moving Past Merger Guidelines
Presumptions, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 317, 332 (noting that Judge Walker required Oracle and
PeopleSoft to have near monopoly power over an identifiable group of customers, which is not
required by either the Guidelines nor by economic theory); James A. Keyte, Arch Coal and Oracle put
the Agencies on the Ropes in Proving Anticompetitive Effects, ANrrrusr, Fall 2004, at 79, 83 (2004)
(opining that Judge Walker's requirement "creates a difficult standard to meet").
55. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d io98, I 117-18 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
56. Compare id. at 1117, with MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.21.
57. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at H IT
58. Id. at s1s8.
59. Id. at i117-18.
6o. E-mail from Andrew Gavil, Professor, Howard University School of Law, to author (Feb. 16,
2oo6, I 1:15:21 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gavil Correspondence].
61. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § i.i I; Gavil Correspondence, supra note 6o.
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anticompetitive effects.62 In a differentiated products case, for instance,
the Guidelines provide that the merger is presumed to be
anticompetitive if a significant number of customers view the merging
products as their first and second choices.63 It is important to note that
the Guidelines do not require that the merged firm be able to raise prices
throughout the entire product market. Instead, the merger is presumed
to be anticompetitive if a "significant share of sales in the market" is
accounted for by customers who view the products as next-best
substitutes. Some customers in the relevant market might view a third
firm as a viable substitute for the merged products and thus be
unaffected by the merger. Under the Guidelines approach, this does not
mean that the merger is legal.
The court's third requirement alters the SSNIP test radically. It uses
the SSNIP test to measure anticompetitive effects rather than to define
the market. In the process, it vastly increases the government's burden of
proof. This use of the SSNIP test goes beyond the Guidelines because it
requires the merging firms alone to have the power to make a SSNIP. On
the other hand, the Guidelines merely use the test to define the market
by asking whether a hypothetical monopolist has the power to make a
SSNIP. This makes a big difference in a case in which three or more
firms compete in the relevant market, as the government alleged in
Oracle." For example, assuming that the government's market definition
was correct that Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP all competed in the
relevant market, the court would require that a combined Oracle and
PeopleSoft have the ability to profitably make a SSNIP in spite of the
competition from SAP. The Guidelines, on the other hand, merely
require that a hypothetical monopolist have the ability to make a
SSNIP.6 By requiring the firms to have the ability to make a SSNIP
across the market, the court requires the market to be defined more
narrowly than do the Guidelines. Otherwise, any competition would
likely prevent such a cross-market SSNIP from being profitable. This will
become especially important because the court also makes it very
difficult for plaintiffs to define a narrow market.66
At first glance, it does not seem strange to require a merged firm to
be able to profitably impose a SSNIP before an agency may consider the
merger anticompetitive. However, the court's analysis requires that the
combined firms have the ability to raise prices throughout the entire
62. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §§ 2.1, .2; Gavil Correspondence, supra note 6o.
63. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.21.
64. The government argued that Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP competed in the relevant market.
Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
65. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 2. To reiterate, the Guidelines do not suggest this
means the merger is anticompetitive, but merely that the market definition is properly drawn.
66. See infra Part III.
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product market. Even if a significant number of customers will face a
price increase as a result of the merger (presumably because the merging
products are their top two choices), the court's analysis would require
ruling against blocking the merger. The Guidelines, on the other hand,
would probably require the agencies to try to stop the merger. The court
explicitly requires that the firms have the ability to raise prices
throughout the market later in its decision. In its section on unilateral
effects, the court rejects as too low the Guidelines' requirement that the
merging firms have a market share of at least 35%: "To prevail on a
differentiated products unilateral effects claim, a plaintiff must prove a
relevant market in which the merging parties would have essentially a
monopoly or dominant position."
67
In essence, the court assumes that unilateral effects can flow only
from a monopolist or near-monopolist, when in fact anticompetitive
effects can arise anytime the merged firm exercises some degree of
market power.68 In addition, longstanding economic theories of oligopoly
and differentiated products contradict the court's assertion that only a
firm with monopoly power has any power over price.69 The court also
assumes that if the two competitors can raise prices but not to the level of
a SSNIP, the merger should not be blocked. Last, because the court's
third factor focuses entirely on the ability to raise prices, it might also fail
to take into account other anticompetitive effects, such as diminution of
innovation incentives.7'
III. SELECTED EVIDENCE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN U.S. V. ORACLE
Regardless of the correctness of the Oracle court's third factor (that
the combined firms must have a monopoly or a dominant position), I
propose that the court was also too selective in the types of evidence it
deemed acceptable. By requiring the government to show a near-
monopoly and then disregarding much of the proof that the government
presented, the court made the government's case prohibitively difficult.
The government was likely to lose regardless of whether the merger
would have caused a significant number of customers to suffer higher
prices.
A. CUSTOMER EVIDENCE
For instance, the court summarizes at some length the testimony of
the government's customer witnesses. 71 The court concedes that the ERP
customers "represent a group of extremely sophisticated buyers and
67. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
68. Gavil Correspondence, supra note 6o.
69. Roundtable, supra note 54, at 10.
70. Gavil Correspondence, supra note 6o.
71. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1125-32.
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users of information technology" with "decades of experience in
negotiating in this field."72 Neither does the court "doubt the sincerity" of
the witnesses.73 Nonetheless, the court found the testimony of customer
witnesses "largely unhelpful" to the government's case,74 in part because
they did not "provide the court with data from actual or probable ERP
purchases and installations.,
75
No one doubts the court must evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
In the case of the government's customer witnesses, however, the court
specifically states that it believes the customers mean what they say. It
simply finds inadequate their methods of arriving at their conclusions
that their companies would pay an extra 5-10% in a post-merger
environment. I posit that in some instances, the court is too selective in
the evidence it considers significant. This level of selectiveness is not the
best means to achieve the statutory goal of determining whether the
merger is likely to result in a price increase.
First, predictive customer testimony often has value. 76 In particular,
customers that recently procured ERP systems should be able to credibly
state whether they would have purchased the same software in spite of a
5-10% price increase.77 After all, those are the customers who have
already been through the months-long process of discerning their own
functional needs and matching up those needs with the offerings of
various ERP vendors. A customer's testimony that it did not consider
any vendor other than Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP, and that it would
not have changed its choices in the face of a 5-10% price increase, is the
most similar evidence available to the specific data requested by the
Oracle court. Similarly, "the fact that the knowledgeable, experienced,
sophisticated, sincere customers that the Division put forward-and
those are all Judge Walker's words-had not conducted extensive
analyses of the costs of using Lawson or AMS, demonstrates something
very important all by itself." Namely, it reflects that the other vendors
72. Id. at 1131.
73. Id. at 1130.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1131.
76. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Substantial Lessening of Competition -The Section 7 Standard,
2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 293, 309 (arguing that while customers are sometimes biased, customer
interests tend to be in line with the goals of the antitrust laws).
77. See, e.g., Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (noting evidence that CH2M Hill would have paid
io% more to acquire Oracle or PeopleSoft); id. (noting evidence that North Dakota would not have
turned to options other than Oracle or PeopleSoft in the face of a lo% price increase); id. at 1129
(noting evidence that Neiman Marcus Group would not have considered any vendor other than Oracle
and PeopleSoft for its FMS and HRM procurements even in the face of a 1o-20% price increase); id.
at 1130 (noting evidence that Verizon would have chosen PeopleSoft, Oracle, or SAP and no other
vendor even if those three vendors increased prices by io%); id. (noting evidence that Cox
Communications would have chosen PeopleSoft or Oracle in the face of a to% price increase).
78. Barnett, supra note 76, at 309.
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likely could not have met the customers' functional needs and therefore
could not have constrained Oracle in a post-merger market.79
Second, failing to consider evidence that lacks supRorting "data from
actual or probable ERP purchases and installations" makes proving a
merger case unreasonably expensive for customer witnesses, the
government, or both. Evaluating ERP vendors sometimes takes over a
year, which makes it a substantial financial investment.8 Many
companies even pay outside consultants to help them through the
process.2 Surely, the government could not reasonably ask customers to
go through that time and expense out of a sense of civic duty. The Oracle
court disregarded one feasible alternative when it dismissed the
testimony of an expert witness about which vendors could offer a viable
solution for particular customers. However, in Oracle, the government
did present expert witness Professor Marco Iansiti. The government
hoped that Professor Iansiti's testimony would help sort out the
differences in functionality between mid-market and high function
solutions, and that he could testify generally as to which types of
customers need high function solutions.8' However, the court did not
apparently believe that Professor lansiti's testimony bolstered the
customers' contentions that they would tolerate a SSNIP by a combined
Oracle and PeopleSoft.84 Realistically, neither the government nor the
customers will have the resources to mimic the actual process of
procuring an ERP solution. For that reason, it is unreasonable to
conclude that "the failure of these witnesses to present cost/benefit
analyses" 85 reflects anything more than financial realities.
B. REQUIRING A BRIGHT LINE MARKET BOUNDARY: DISREGARDING
TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESS MARCO IANSITI
The government put forth three expert witnesses: Professors
Kenneth Elzinga, Preston McAfee, and Marco lansiti. The court focused
79. Id.
8o. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
81. See Lauren Hoyt, Grocer's ERP Selection Hinges On Milk, SEARCHSAP.coM, May 26, 2005,
http://searchsap.techtarget.com/originalContent/o,289142,sid2 l-gCilO92250,0o.html (noting that
Brookshire Grocery Co. selection process took one year); The ERP Selection Process, University of
Illinois, http://www-archive.ui-integrate.uillinois.edu/overerp-selection.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2007)
(indicating that University of Illinois took six months to issue a request for information and nineteen
months to complete the selection process, including the signing of the contract with the vendor).
82. See, e.g., Oracle, 33i F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28 (stating that Greyhound Lines hired CDG &
Associates and AIMCO hired Towers Perrin).
83. The specific types of evidence Professor lansiti gave will be discussed below. See infra Part
III.B.
84. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34. The court does not mention Professor Iansiti's testimony
during the discussion of customer testimony. Id. See infra Part III.B. for analysis of the court's
treatment of Professor lansiti's analysis.
85. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
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more of its attention on the testimony of Professors Elzinga and McAfee,
but Professor lansiti's testimony was also significant. Professor lansiti
testified as an industry expert. He attempted to show that for a
significant group of customers, Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP were the
only realistic options. However, the court did not credit Professor
Jansiti's testimony because he did not use economic analysis and failed to
show a bright enough boundary around the government's proposed
product market.'
The court had room to require a clearly defined market boundary
because little case law exists for merger cases in general, and for
differentiated products cases in particular. However, I propose that a
clearly demarcated market boundary is not the wisest requirement. By
mandating a bright line, the court sets the bar yet higher for the
government. The increased burden could permit mergers that have the
effect of substantially lessening competition, which the Clayton Act
forbids. In addition, economic analysis along with common sense bolsters
the assertion that the court's requirement of a bright line product market
is not reasonable in differentiated products and unilateral effects cases."7
Professor lansiti attempted to show that a significant group of
customers existed for whom Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP were the only
realistic options. He testified that in order for a large complex enterprise
to process transactions and manage its information, the software must
meet certain high function requirements. 88 For instance, the software may
need to be able to operate in multiple languages and currencies and
across multiple jurisdictions in order to correctly reflect the actual
structure and organization of the firm.89 For some customers, it must be
highly configurable so that the user can mold the software to meet
business needs without expensive software customization.' Professor
lansiti also testified that many customers require vendors to demonstrate
research and development investment9' and sufficient financial stability.9
Professor Iansiti reviewed 148 vendors, keeping these business
requirements in mind, and determined that only Oracle, PeopleSoft, and
SAP were able to satisfy those high function requirements.93
86. Id. at 1133-34.
87. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some
Antitrust Policy Issues, 42 ArmTRusr BULL. 177 (i997); Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old
Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 ANTrRUST L.J. 203 (2ooo) [hereinafter Baker,
Submarkets]; Marc G. Schildkraut, Oracle and the Future of Unilateral Effects, ANTrrRUST, Spring 20o5,
at 20, 22.
88. PFOF, supra note 33, 1 2.111.1.7.
89. Id. 1 2.I.11.I.10
90. Id. 2.2.2.
91. Id. 1 2.3.2.1.
92. Id. 1 2.3.1.2.
93. Id. 91 2.5.
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The court, however, determined that Professor lansiti's testimony
failed to establish a product market.94 The court noted that Professor
lansiti had "conceded that there is not a 'clear line or demarcation' to
distinguish" the high function market from the mid-market.95 It stated,
"Because of his lack of economic analysis and his inability to identify
articulable product market boundaries (a key issue in a horizontal
merger case), the court finds that lansiti failed to establish a clearly
defined product market along the lines alleged by plaintiffs." 9 In other
words, the court wanted a thin black line around the product market.
Because the plaintiffs could not pinpoint the exact boundary, the court
found that the government had not fulfilled its burden of determining a
"clearly defined product market."'
One might argue, however, that at least in a differentiated products,
unilateral effects case such as Oracle, a clear boundary around the
defined product market is unnecessary. Decidedly, in the merger context,
"[tihe purpose of market definitions is not to frustrate anti-trust plaintiffs
by requiring the proof of bright lines which do not exist." In addition,
economists support the notion that requiring a clear separation between
the products in and out of the relevant market has much less utility in a
unilateral effects case than in a coordinated effects case." For instance,
Professor Jonathan Baker asserts that in differentiated products cases,
"market definition is generally not very helpful as a first step in assessing
the potential loss of localized competition" because "market shares...
often reveal little about the competitive role played by individual
firms."" Marc Schildkraut illustrates this concept with an example of a
series of evenly-spaced gasoline stations along a north-south highway.''
If one gas station acquires the two stations on either side of it, it may
raise prices in its original station.' °2 The station operator may profitably
raise prices at the middle station because it makes more money from
those motorists who continue to stop at that station."° However, he does
not lose any revenue from the motorists who bypass the middle station
because they will stop at the next one it owns either to the north or the
south.' Despite this obvious market power, under a conventional
94. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
95. Id. (quoting Transcript of Trial at 2088 1.7 to 2090 1.21).
96. Id. at 1134.
97. Id.
98. Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 28o (ist Cir. 1982)
(citing United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956)).
99. See sources cited supra note 87.
IOO. Baker, Submarkets, supra note 87, at 217-18.
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market definition, the three gas stations fail to make up a market at all
because there is no discontinuity.5
Just as the gasoline stations lacked a bright line between the start
and the end of the geographic market, the government in Oracle did not
argue that there was an industry-wide acceptance of its line between mid-
market software and high function software.' 6 However, it contended
that the distinction between mid-market and high function software was
nonetheless meaningful,"° and that the merger would lead to increased
prices for a significant number of customers.'8 To bolster its argument, it
pointed out that Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP have separate products
and sales forces dedicated to selling mid-market products."° Just because
the government could not pinpoint precisely where the high function
market begins and the mid-market ends does not mean that the merger
will not harm competition.
C. INTERNAL BUSINESS DOCUMENTS
In addition to putting forth customer testimony and expert
witnesses, the government put into evidence internal documents by
Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP. One of the government's purposes in
presenting this evidence was to show that Oracle and PeopleSoft viewed
one another as their top competitors."' The government also intended to
show that Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP viewed themselves as making up
a separate market for high function software."' I contend that these
documents merit more attention than the Oracle court gave them. I also
note that the court's theory of unilateral effects allowed the court to
disregard some of this valuable evidence.
First, these documents are likely to reflect the knowledge of some of
the most well-informed people about the competitive condition in that
marketplace. The logic of the market dictates that companies have a
strong incentive to learn about their competitors in an accurate and
timely fashion. This is doubly true when, as here, competitors customize
their prices for each individual customer. For instance, if a customer has
105. Id.
IO6. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d io98, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (Professor lansiti
acknowledging that different parties tend to define mid-market differently).
107. PFOF, supra note 33, T 2.6.
io8. Id. 1 3 .1..
109. Id. 91 2.6.2.
io. Id. 1 7.1.1 ("Oracle's Own Statements, Documents, and Actions Show That PeopleSoft Is its
Most Significant Competitor in Applications Sales."); id. 91 7.1.2 ("PeopleSoft's Own Statements,
Documents, and Actions Show that Oracle Is its Most Significant Competitor in Applications Sales.").
iii. E.g., id. 1 5.3 ("Oracle, Peoplesoft, and SAP Primarily View Each Other as Competitors for
the Sale of High-function Software."). The most significant impact of this evidence was described by
Professor Kenneth Elzinga, who testified as an expert witness. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at I 145. The
court did not credit this testimony because it found that Professor Elzinga's product market was
unconvincing. Id. at 1145-48.
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ten other good options, the seller will likely wish to give that customer a
lower price than if the customer had no other good options. However,
before the seller can take advantage of its flexible pricing, it must know
what the customers' needs are and what other solutions could fill those
needs. In the context of ERP solutions, that means that vendors have a
strong incentive to learn as much as possible about competitors'
functionality and about buyers' needs. They are also likely to want to
know which other solutions buyers tend to view as the most similar to
their own products. Therefore, industry competitors are likely to be
experts on the competitive condition in the marketplace."'
Second, internal documents are likely to accurately reflect the
competitors' opinions. While it is possible that companies would create
misleading documents for the purpose of throwing off antitrust agencies,
courts and agencies can reduce this danger by looking solely at
documents created before company executives began considering the
merger. It is unlikely that a company could efficiently create inaccurate
documents for the purposes of slipping under the antitrust radar."3
Perhaps for these reasons, both the courts and the Guidelines look
to company documents to support assertions about competition in the
marketplace. The Guidelines explicitly suggest that agencies should look
to "normal course of business documents from industry participants" to
help determine whether the merging firms are next-best substitutes.'
Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, credit evidence of competitors'
opinions as well."5
The Oracle court did not ignore internal documents altogether. In
addition, it received volumes of documents into evidence, and should not
be expected to respond to each document. However, the court should
have considered two types of company documents differently in Oracle.
First, some of the documents that the court discussed but decided were
unimportant should have been given more weight. Second, some select
I12. But see Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The
Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARz. L. REV.
6o9, 651-54 (2oo5) (arguing that business documents are not always accurate and that many of them
should not be used for antitrust purposes).
113. For a discussion on why companies are unlikely to create misleading documentation, see
Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 Wis. L. REV.
1035, 1140-41.
114. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.211 n.22.
ii5. E.g., California v. Am. Stores, 872 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that "American
Stores's own internal marketing documents indicating that American Stores considers other
supermarkets to be its only competitors" supports the district court's judgment that supermarkets is
the relevant product market); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488,494
(9th Cir. 1977) (concluding that evidence that leasing companies do not consider service bureaus or
time-sharing arrangements to be competitors is part of "ample evidence" that service bureaus and
time-sharing arrangements do not provide an acceptable alternative to those who might buy or lease
computer systems).
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internal business documents which were highlighted by the government's
Proposed Findings of Fact should have been given more consideration in
the Oracle opinion.
In its section on plaintiffs' evidence of unilateral effects, the court
mentions Oracle's quarterly "win/loss" documents. ' 6 In Quarter Three of
2003, Oracle wrote that "PeopleSoft is our #i competitor" and "SAP is
our #2 competitor."...7 The government used this document to support its
contention that Oracle and PeopleSoft were next-best substitutes for a
significant number of customers. The court pointed out that the same
document stated that Oracle lost to PeopleSoft 54% of the time, and it
lost to SAP 53 % of the time, a difference of only i%. The Quarter Four
win/loss document similarly stated that Oracle lost to PeopleSoft 59% of
the time and to SAP 50% of the time."8 Accordingly, the court stated, it
could "draw no conclusions from the conflicting data within the win/loss
reports upon which plaintiffs focus. In fact, these documents arguably
negate a showing of localization between Oracle and PeopleSoft more
than they support such a finding."" 9
Under the court's theory that two companies must have a near
monopoly for a finding of unilateral effects to succeed, the fact that SAP
and PeopleSoft both compete heavily with Oracle might harm the
government's case. However, under the Guidelines theory described
above, 2' the government does not need to prove that PeopleSoft is
Oracle's only serious competitor. The question is whether a significant
number of customers would suffer a small but significant non-transitory
increase in price if Oracle and PeopleSoft were to merge. The fact that
PeopleSoft is Oracle's biggest competitor is relevant to this question. If
Oracle and PeopleSoft frequently compete head to head, it is likely that
a significant number of customers see PeopleSoft and Oracle as their two
best options. The court should be asking whether many of those
customers who would choose PeopleSoft over Oracle (or Oracle over
PeopleSoft) will have to pay a higher price because of the merger.
In addition, the court omitted any mention of the numerous
documents that show that Oracle spends more resources monitoring and
attacking PeopleSoft than other competitors. For instance, Oracle
initiated a campaign called "Kill PeopleSoft" which involved heavy
discounting to stop or slow PeopleSoft's financial management licenses."'
PeopleSoft responded by discounting its price, driving for high customer
i 16. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1i66.
117. PFOF, supra note 33, 1 7.1.1.2; accord United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d io98,
1166 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
1I8. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1i66.
ii9. Id. at 1166-67.
i2o. See supra Part III.B.
121. PFOF, supra note 33, 17.1-1-5.1.3.
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satisfaction, and investing in research and development to lower its total
cost of ownership to customers.'22 Oracle also had a "War Room" that
generated weekly "War Room Reports" dedicated to monitoring its
competition with PeopleSoft.'23 Oracle had no similar war room
dedicated to other competitors and did not generate similar weekly
reports on other competitors."4 The government also introduced dozens
of documents demonstrating that Oracle gave huge discounts to
customers who were also considering PeopleSoft.' 5 In addition, the
government produced many e-mails by top Oracle executives candidly
explaining that PeopleSoft was a top competitor. For instance, in a 2003
e-mail, Oracle vice president Keith Block wrote to Oracle CEO Larry
Ellison that with PeopleSoft, "[e]ach sales cycle is a street fight but my
people expect this going in. ,,,6
These documents alone could not be the basis for finding that the
proposed merger between Oracle and PeopleSoft would harm
competition. However, if the goal is to discern whether a significant
number of customers will pay higher prices as a result of the merger, the
documents are relevant evidence. Evidence that fierce, ongoing price-
cutting resulted from competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft lends
credence to the proposition that PeopleSoft's rivalry with Oracle kept
prices lower. The fact that Oracle spent resources monitoring
competition with PeopleSoft and attacking PeopleSoft in a manner
unique to that vendor suggests that PeopleSoft was Oracle's biggest
threat.
CONCLUSION
The Oracle court is well-versed in antitrust law, and its decision is
considered, extensive, and articulate. 7 The court is not bound by the
Guidelines, and may well be correct that they should be revised or
altered. This Note's intent is not to suggest that the Oracle court strayed
beyond its precedent. Instead, the intent is to contrast the court's
imposed burden of proof and requirements of evidence with those of the
Guidelines. Contrasting the Oracle decision with the Guidelines
approach illustrates the extent to which the Oracle decision's reasoning
could preclude successful opposition to future mergers.
To follow the Oracle court's reasoning would have the practical




125. See, e.g., id. 7.1.17.1 to .21,7.3.2.2.3.
126. Id. 91 7.11.10.2.
127. See Roundtable, supra note 54, at 6 (Mr. Yde opining that "Judge Walker is known as a
judge with antitrust experience and training").
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Oracle decision. In some cases, it might even thwart the Clayton Act's
goal of preventing mergers that could result in a substantial lessening of
competition. For this reason, judges and lawyers involved in future
merger cases should look to the Oracle decision with full knowledge of
its policy implications. Perhaps this oracle forecasts a future best
prevented.
910 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:891
